Singapore, December 19, 2007
For the past two months, military discourse in Indonesia has been colored by the Department of Defense’s intention to submit a draft bill regarding the formation of a reserve component.
Although there hasn’t been a clear consensus on whether this would be done through mandatory national service or not, the DoD claimed that they are currently finalizing the draft bill for submission next year.
This has certainly sparked pros and cons.
Proponents argue that our defense doctrine, Total Defense System, mandates a reserve component to support the military as the core component of national defense.
Meanwhile, detractors from NGOs believe that there are many unfinished military reform agenda, including military businesses, tribunal, or even resolution of past human rights cases.
Parliamentarians seem to believe that such draft bill could not be processed before the DoD submit their defense posture blueprint, strategic defense review, and white paper – a position also taken by various academics and observers. Meanwhile, the public seems to be split.
In a November Kompas poll, 69.5% of the respondents agrees with DoD’s draft bill, thinking that it would strengthen national defense, which 90.7% believed to be the responsibility of the TNI and the people. Ironically, 50.2% refused to participate in a mandatory military service, while 65.6% were concerned it might increase violence and militaristic behavior in the society.
Despite of these debates, not many have focused on the doctrine of Total Defense itself. All the while, this is the source of all the confusion. If we want to stay true to Total Defense, then a reserve component, through whatever means, is inevitable. This article however, argues that considering Indonesia’s current strategic landscape, an operational war doctrine based on Total Defense might be problematic.
Whatever its manifestations, Total Defense in conventional warfare is based on the principles of attrition warfare against enemy forces. This is where we try to defeat the enemy by physically destroying its forces, slowly (guerilla) or rapidly (annihilation).
The key concepts here are: “initial-force ratios,” real or perceived numerical and materiel superiority of one side over the other, “loss ratios,” rate of losses in men and materiel by both sides as a result of battle, and “fractional exchange ratios,” loss ratio over the initial force ratio expressed algebraically. The idea is to improve the force ratio by achieving and sustaining an acceptable loss ratio over the enemy.
A doctrine, like our Total Defense, based on such a theory holds that logic as a main guide. This of course is based on our historical experience from fighting guerilla warfare against the Dutch in the early days of Independence, and later against regional rebellions.
During those days, especially between 1940s up to 1960s – where instability and disintegration was a looming prospect, attrition warfare made perfect sense. Indeed, we would not have gained and maintained our independence without it. The question today is whether such doctrine is in accordance with what Clausewitz, the prominent theorist of war dubbed, “the spirit of the age.”
Today’s strategic landscape include a wide spectrum of threats, from traditional (military) to non-traditional ones (non-military) – hence the responses of Military Operations in War and Military Operations other than War. Under these conditions, is attrition warfare still relevant for Indonesia? Should Total Defense be abandoned?
The end of the Cold War and globalization virtually eliminated any possible invasion from an external force, although it should be noted that disputes with neighboring countries remain. In the event of diplomatic breakdowns of such disputes, military deterrence would still be better amplified with military hardware anyway. This renders the possibility of attrition warfare against foreign enemies irrelevant.
How about internal security such as separatism and terrorism? As we have seen in the past two years, counter-terrorism efforts by the police have certainly improved the security condition. While fighting against separatist movements using attrition warfare is perhaps a logical fallacy.
A nation’s military cannot get bogged down in prolonged insurgency warfare, unless they have an interest to. Military history has shown us that the longer an insurgency war drags on, the more likely the government would be on the losing side. Thus, the nation’s military should find a way to end such conflict rapidly.
As regards to the rise of the so-called non-traditional security issues, like pandemics, environmental degradation, natural disasters, etc, certainly military force could not employ an attrionist strategy here. Inter-agency and closer civil-military cooperation is the key in such circumstances.
A final note on attrition warfare is that it is going to be bloody. The price of human loss will most likely be high in the event of a prolonged war, whether against an external or internal enemy.
However, this is not to say that we should overhaul the Total Defense system, which is the core of our national doctrine as well. A complete overhaul might lead to constitutional amendments and redrafting of the TNI law, which is tantamount to opening Pandora’s Box.
Therefore, this article is merely suggesting that we should modify the military’s operational doctrine while maintaining the philosophical foundation of Total Defense, which is the maximization of all national resources to defend Indonesia.
In the realm of conventional warfare, and considering our finite military resources, perhaps a doctrine based on maneuver warfare is something worth considering.
Maneuver warfare is based on attempts to defeat the enemy through means other than simple destruction of his forces. We try to paralyze him rather than to relentlessly attack his strength. This is generally done through: preemption (neutralize him before the fight), dislocation (removing him from the decisive point), and disruption (neutralize his center of gravity: the hub of all power or critical vulnerability).
That being said, the bottom line is that we need a reconsideration and public debate regarding the operational aspects of military reforms, including doctrinal developments. This is necessary if we truly wish to see a professional ‘militarized,’ not a ‘politicized,’ armed forces.
Filed under: Civil-Military Relations
